by Jeff Treder
Over most of my life, in a desultory but dogged way, I have been pondering some of the fundamental questions of philosophy: How, if at all, does a human being differ from other objects, including other animals? How do we gain knowledge? What kinds of things can we know? Are moral categories objects of knowledge? Can we know for sure that we know anything at all? How?
Recently in this ambling quest I was led to a book published in 1921 by the British philosopher William Sorley called Moral Values and the Idea of God. This book originated as a series of lectures delivered at Cambridge University in 1914-15, subsequently revised for publication. (It’s out of print, but I got a nice age-spotted second edition through Abe Books.) I wasn’t sure if I would find it valuable or even readable, but it turns out to be, for me at least, pure gold. It’s written in formal philosophical language and so isn’t easy going, but Sorley’s writing is as clear as his thinking (clear writing generally reflects clear thinking—and unclear, unclear). This book is the best treatment I’ve ever seen of the family of questions in the previous paragraph, and reading it was like having my own half-formed ideas transformed into a full and coherent exposition. In what follows I will be setting forth my own thoughts on the subject as well as summarizing Sorley’s argument, and the two are largely the same thing—though no summary can do justice to five hundred carefully reasoned pages.
Even in Sorley’s day, and all the more since then, the dominant worldview among philosophers and other intellectuals has been what is generally called modernism, lately joined and to some extent supplanted by postmodernism. One main thing these two variants have in common is a rejection of philosophical absolutes, particularly absolute intellectual value (that is, truth) and absolute moral value. Sorley’s book focuses on the second of these, moral value, as the valid and appropriate way to establish the first. As I have suggested, Sorley was swimming against the current in his own time, and that current has since become a torrent. The important thing, though, is not how popular an idea is, but whether it’s true—indeed, in this case, whether there even is such a thing as truth. One basic liability of modernism’s subversion, and postmodernism’s outright denial, of the possibility of our knowing truth is the self-referential fallacy involved: Trust us, folks, there is no such thing as truth, and that is the truth.
Sorley’s critique of modernist epistemology (theory of knowledge) begins by pointing out its incompleteness. Especially as represented by materialism (also known as naturalism), this epistemology asserts that all our knowledge derives from our sensory experience of the natural world. This knowledge is inherently limited, contingent on the limits of both our experience (the data received) and our ability to analyze and interpret it. Thus far, Sorley agrees. But then he notes and emphasizes that the materialist account of our experience leaves out one of the major components of that experience, indeed the primary component. We are not just beings that receive and react to sensory input, we are self-aware beings. Like God, in whose image the Bible says we are made, we are inherently aware that “I am” (see Gen.1:27, Ex.3:14; this reference to the Bible is my own, however; Sorley builds his argument without reference to divine revelation). Bound up inextricably with our self-awareness is the thinking process itself; we are reasoning beings who are capable of considering various possible actions, making decisions, and acting on those decisions. We are not merely things, and not merely animals—though we are those—we are persons. As persons, we have two further and momentous characteristics, which are both as indelible a part of our primary experience as is our awareness of the natural world. These are interpersonal communication and moral values.
First, in our sensory survey of the world around us, among the great variety of sensory objects we discern, we normally encounter other beings who, we discover, are self-aware persons just as we are. And the way we discover this common personality is through our capacity for language, both sign language and the much more capacious and sophisticated resources of spoken language. Soon we discover that these other persons have the same ability we have to remember, to reflect, to compare, to purpose, to plan and strategize, and to act toward the fulfillment of those plans and stragegies. (That list, of course, could be extended.) We may wonder whether other animals—say, foxes and whales—share these abilities with us to some extent. Answering this question is problematic and limited to speculation precisely because other animals do not share with us the ability to communicate as persons (or, as with chimps, the extent to which they share it is defined by its extreme limitation). As philosophers since the ancient Greeks have noted, humans are the animals distinguished by being rational (at any rate, capable of reasoning), and we know this about ourselves mainly because we talk with one another.
Our status as rational beings leads to the second momentous aspect of our primary experience as persons. In interpreting some particular action as being rational or irrational, we are judging, first of all, the extent to which the action achieved its purpose. If I wish to survive in the arctic, it would be irrational to shed my parka. Very often, however, we are judging not only the action but the purpose itself. If I point a gun at my fellow arctic voyager and force him to shed his parka, I may have achieved my purpose, but in a jury of my peers, some are apt to condemn both my action and its purpose as being contrary to the dictates of reason. To them, murder (actual or attempted) is irrational. Other jurors, though, might demur and view my action as fully rational—I knew what I was doing and intended to do it—but it was immoral, evil, wrong.
Untangling this dispute is difficult because the dispute reflects not just the definition of terms but complications in the history of our civilization. In earlier times (and in Sorley’s view, and still today in many cultures) the intellectual consensus was that our reason perceives and acts upon both natural law and moral law. Natural laws reflect and describe the order we find in the physical universe, while moral laws reflect and describe the order we find in the human universe, the world of human beings. At a very basic level, our language expresses this distinction in the difference between what “is” and what a person “ought to do” (we do not say, in any serious way, that rivers or bears “ought to” do anything). Modernist materialism and postmodern hyper-skepticism, however, deny the real or objective or absolute existence of this moral order. In their worldview, there is no compelling evidence that such an order actually exists or even could exist, and therefore when we make moral judgments, we are only expressing our own opinion, our own subjective values. There is, in this view, nothing more to be expressed. Indeed, when materialism follows its own logic, it concludes that all our consciousness—including what may seem to us like reason and personal values—is actually only an epiphenomenon of electrical activity in our cerebral cortex: an illusion. Our personality, in the sense that Sorley and philosophers in general use the term, is an illusion.
Returning to the jurors trying my case: Supposing they are not philosophers and don’t pay much attention to their worldviews, some of them may, perhaps unwittingly, assume the more traditional view that the moral order is real and that we can and should (ought to) obey it. They will say that murder is both immoral and irrational: irrational, that is, not in the sense of “without reason” (they think I did know what I was doing and did intend it) but “against reason” (rationality itself declares that I ought not to have done it). At the other end of the spectrum, some materialist or postmodern jurors, holding, perhaps unwittingly, that moral values are purely subjective, may say that murder, along with crime in general, is a social problem or malfunction and ought to be dealt with as such. Murder may be the ultimate social problem, but it cannot be more than a social problem because human society is not part of any higher order. Some jurors may even think that murder is ipso facto evidence of mental illness; my action was irrational in the sense of “without reason,” and I ought to be subjected to psychiatric evaluation. Still other jurors, perhaps the majority, will see-saw in their thinking between these two worldviews.
Notice that I have represented the materialist/postmodern jurors as thinking, just as much as the traditionalist jurors, that I “ought to” be treated in such-and-such a way. From whence do they derive this “ought”? Isn’t it rather like an atheist praying? This question brings us to the heart of Sorley’s critique of materialist ethics.
Consider an extreme moral crime, such as the torture and murder of babies or children. Is there anyone with a materialist/postmodern worldview who would think, “I consider such a thing terrible and absolutely unacceptable, but it might be all right for someone else to do it if it seems acceptable to them”? Or would he or she be apt to think, “Our society condemns such behavior, but we have no grounds on which to condemn some other society in which torturing babies is regarded as acceptable behavior”? These attitudes represent moral relativism taken to its extreme, and in fact you will find almost no sane person who thinks that way. That being so, however, we are left with the question of the grounds on which the moral relativist does in fact condemn the heinous acts of other individuals or other societies. The answer, I think, is that in practice we find that people’s thinking on such matters is usually inconsistent and confused. In theory they might accept the modernist/postmodern worldview, while in practice they often forget the theory and borrow some absolute moral norms—like the atheist praying. That people are inconsistent and confused is no revelation, but neither is it a good way to be.
But why? Why do people whose worldview has no place for absolute ethics often feel the need to borrow them? Sorley’s analysis of our human experience, I think, supplies the most probable answer. In his description of our experience, as I noted above, our reason perceives and acts upon both natural law and moral law. Natural laws reflect and describe the order we find in the physical universe, while moral laws reflect and describe the order we find in the human universe, the world of human beings. The difference between natural and moral law is that objects in the natural universe (including our bodies) have no choice about whether to obey, for instance, the law of gravity. Natural “laws” are really a generalized description of how objects in the natural universe do in fact interact with one another. In the human universe, on the other hand, when we perceive a moral law—an “ought”—we always have the choice whether or not to obey it. As persons, that is, we are free in a way in which, as objects, we are not. We can and do choose how to interact with one another. As persons we have capacities which merely natural objects do not have: emotions, mind, will, and conscience.
Emotions, to some degree, we undoubtedly share with the higher animals. To what extent we share minds—the power to think—with them is impossible to determine with certainty, as I said before, due to the absence of communication; but the evidence we have suggests that, to any meaningful degree, we share it with ourselves alone (and, of course, if God exists, with God). Our will is the specific capacity to make choices based on both our sensory information about our physical environment and our mental perception of the moral law—that is, both what we can do physically and what we ought to do, or refrain from doing, morally. And our conscience is the capacity which directs our will in making moral choices; specifically, our concience tells our will to choose the good and reject the evil. The extent to which we disobey our conscience is the measure of our moral corruption.
Our conscience, however, is vulnerable to prolonged opposition. It weakens as our will hardens against it. We become hardened in our pride or greed or bitterness or self-pity. Without any change in this process—repentance—we die spiritually, losing the vital heart of our humanity.
I want to emphasize here, as Sorley also emphasizes, that what he describes as our universal human experience of moral values is not something that he, as a moral philosopher, is making up. Human beings really do value such virtues as love, honesty, humility, faithfulness, kindness, mercy, and generosity. We really do reprehend evils like deceitfulness, faithlessness, cowardice, and cruelty. These are essential elements of our primary human experience. To be sure, our perception of these values differs to some extent from one culture to another, but that circumstance reflects the same deficiency as does our personal failure to consistently follow our conscience. We fall far short of perfect, that is, both as individuals and as societies, and there is variety in our imperfection. (The Bible, of course, explains the reason for this, but Sorley bases his argument on human experience itself, apart from divine revelation.) Our various individual and societal imperfections, however, by no means imply that moral values and moral law do not exist. Our longing, as human beings, for moral improvement, both personal and societal, itself implies a source and a goal for that longing.
According to Sorley, then, there is decisive evidence in human experience that an objective and absolute moral law exists. But we humans are subjective (“I am”), finite, and morally imperfect. Our moral values are subjective in the sense that they are our values, our personal perception of absolute moral value. And they are relative in the sense that they have meaning only in relation to other persons—other humans or God—as well as in the sense that our achievement in living up to them is imperfect. But they are not merely relative or merely subjective or merely societal. We can arrive at this conclusion for two reasons, one positive and the other negative.
Positively—and this is the substance of Sorley’s main argument—our human experience considered and understood in its fullness supports, and indeed requires, the conclusion that an objective moral order exists. Negatively, the course that the mainstream of philosophy, popular as well as formal, has taken in the century since Sorley wrote Moral Values and the Idea of God exemplifies the intellectual and existential problems entailed in the rejection of moral absolutes. The abandonment of absolute truth produces immediate intellectual incoherence (it’s true that nothing is true). If there is only “my truth” and “your truth,” we are misusing language in identifying truth with opinion. Insofar as “my truth” and “your truth” mean “my reality” and “your reality,” our worldview has shattered into endless fragments—which of course is exactly the world-view of postmodernism. Meaning itself has become meaningless. Human communication, essential to human personality, founders in the chaos of incoherence.
This incoherence spreads ruinously when all absolute moral values are abandoned. We are left with an unstoppable reductionism, like Shakespeare’s “universal wolf” which eats everything until at last it eats itself (Troilus and Cressida, I, iii, 121-124). Moral values are reduced to personal opinion or feeling or taste. Human persons are reduced to just animals. Animals are reduced to just complex objects. Objects are reduced to atoms, atoms to quarks, quarks to quanta of mass/energy. Even if those quanta have managed to evolve into a human brain, they still can’t attain to personality, because personality doesn’t exist to be attained. The loss that we miss most in this reductionist orgy, I think, is exactly this loss of personality. But to retain personality—humanity—we must recognize that moral values exist, objectively and absolutely, and that we are subject to them. They are over us, in a way that only the existence of God can adequately explain.
There are other possible worldviews besides the two under consideration here (Hinduism, for instance). But between these two, the alternative is either/or. There is no coherent compromise. And the rejection of moral law itself produces incoherence. Not only do moral values exist, but we, as human persons, can’t exist without them.